Phillips 3-4 calls for faster ILBs
By Rafael Vela
Wade Phillips moved Bobby Carpenter and Kevin Burnett, outside linebackers in Bill Parcells’ system inside during the first camp. While the move revived the familiar debate of whether Carpenter is a bust, a closer look at Phillips’ scheme shows these are in no way demotions.
For a quick X & Os review of Phillips’ coverage, look at Bob Davie’s illustrated lecture on zone blitzing. Note his first diagram, where he shows a standard two deep coverage scheme with a four man rush.
Even though Davie diagrams this for a 4-3, this was Dallas’ standard package in the 3-4. The Cowboys rushed four men most of the time. Think of the weakside end “E” in the diagram, as Demarcus Ware and the “SB” or strong backer as Greg Ellis.
Dallas would most frequently rush the weakside end, so if the tight end lined up across from Ellis, he would drop and Ware would come. Conversely, if the TE faced Ware, he would cover and Ellis would rush.
You can see the problems caused by this scheme when Ellis tore his Achilles tendon. Unless the Cowboys flopped their ends, the offense could dictate which end rushed by flopping their TE. When both OLBs were healthy, either could pressure the QB. When Ware was the only big-time OLB rush option, teams would overshift to his side and push him into coverage.
Look at the back half of the zone, where each safety has responsibility over a deep half. This was the source of so many problems, as both Keith Davis and Pat Watkins had trouble rotating to their side and tracking deep balls in the air.
DC Brian Stewart told ESPN Radio in Dallas last week that the team would no longer employ this deep coverage, also freeing SS Roy Williams from deep patrol. What we can expect are more cover three looks (see Davie’s second diagram) where you have a free safety in the deep middle and the corners taking care of the sidelines of the deep thirds.
Note also that you now have four defenders responsble for the short zones, rather than five in the standard cover two looks.
Phillips will probably gamble even more with the short zones. He’s admitted he will zone blitz a lot of the time, bringing at least five men at the QB. When the Cowboys do, they’ll have only three short zone defenders, as opposed to five in the cover two Dallas played so much in ‘06. This will place a greater premium on recognition and speed.
Take a look at the last two diagrams in Davie’s piece for an idea of how this will work. In each case the defense rushes five and sets in a 3-3 look behind it. For a look at Phillips’ zone blitz in the flesh, refer to this video of the ‘06 Chargers against Pittsburgh.
Pay particular attention to the first blitz on the reel, labeled “OLB stunt.” Use the pause button in the lower left to stop the action as the play unfolds.
This is a classic weakside overload. The Chargers line up in a base 3-4 look prior to the snap, with NT Jamal Williams shading to the strong side. The first key to the play is San Diego’s late blitz deployment. ILB Donnie Edwards waits until just before the snap before hustling to the line and blitzing in the A gap between the center and left guard. His late deployment gave the Steelers’ linemen little time to recognize the blitz and adjust their blocking accordingly.
Contrast this to Dallas’ blitzes last year, which tipped off their intentions well before the snap and allowed opposing QBs to audible to nullifying plays. Think of Jeff Garcia’s many such adjustments in the second Eagles’ game.
Back to the Chargers’ blitz. At the snap they have four rushers deployed against three Pittsburgh blockers on Ben Roethlisberger’s blind side. Williams rushes between the C and RG, tying them up. Edwards draws the LG and DRE Igor Olshansky loops wide to his right, taking the Steelers’ LT with him.
As a result, there is nobody to block OLB Shawne Merriman, who loops inside Olshansky and has an open lane to the QB. He bears down on Roethlisberger and forces a hurried, off-balance throw that is picked off.
Move the video forwards a second or so and look at the Chargers’ coverage. You have a 3-3 deployment in the secondary. This looks like a 5-1 at first, because the CBs are crowding the line, but each has responsibility for receivers cutting deep through their areas while the FS takes the lone receiver running a deep route through the middle.
The shorter coverage raises several points about Dallas’ ‘07 schemes. First, note that on this play the SS has responsibility for the short zone on the defense’s right. This would be Roy Williams’ in a Cowboys’ package. When Stewart said Roy Williams would no longer be in deep cover two as he was last year, this is what he’s referring to. Williams will either blitz or work on short zones, waiting for flaring RBs or receivers running short crossing routes in front of him. This plays much better to his skills than trying to turn and run with TEs and receivers in space.
Next, note that if both OLBs are blitzing or if Williams is blitzing that the flats will be the ILBs responsibility. Who do you trust more to man these expanded short zones, James and Ayodele or guys like Burnett, who played in the nickel, and Carpenter, who demonstrated cover skills in the Seattle game, where he defensed three passes?
That’s why nobody should look upon the ILB moves as demotions. Burnett’s and Carpenter’s cover skills will probably have as much to do with Phillips’ blitzing success as Ware’s, Ellis’ and Spencers’ rush skills.
Wade Phillips moved Bobby Carpenter and Kevin Burnett, outside linebackers in Bill Parcells’ system inside during the first camp. While the move revived the familiar debate of whether Carpenter is a bust, a closer look at Phillips’ scheme shows these are in no way demotions.
For a quick X & Os review of Phillips’ coverage, look at Bob Davie’s illustrated lecture on zone blitzing. Note his first diagram, where he shows a standard two deep coverage scheme with a four man rush.
Even though Davie diagrams this for a 4-3, this was Dallas’ standard package in the 3-4. The Cowboys rushed four men most of the time. Think of the weakside end “E” in the diagram, as Demarcus Ware and the “SB” or strong backer as Greg Ellis.
Dallas would most frequently rush the weakside end, so if the tight end lined up across from Ellis, he would drop and Ware would come. Conversely, if the TE faced Ware, he would cover and Ellis would rush.
You can see the problems caused by this scheme when Ellis tore his Achilles tendon. Unless the Cowboys flopped their ends, the offense could dictate which end rushed by flopping their TE. When both OLBs were healthy, either could pressure the QB. When Ware was the only big-time OLB rush option, teams would overshift to his side and push him into coverage.
Look at the back half of the zone, where each safety has responsibility over a deep half. This was the source of so many problems, as both Keith Davis and Pat Watkins had trouble rotating to their side and tracking deep balls in the air.
DC Brian Stewart told ESPN Radio in Dallas last week that the team would no longer employ this deep coverage, also freeing SS Roy Williams from deep patrol. What we can expect are more cover three looks (see Davie’s second diagram) where you have a free safety in the deep middle and the corners taking care of the sidelines of the deep thirds.
Note also that you now have four defenders responsble for the short zones, rather than five in the standard cover two looks.
Phillips will probably gamble even more with the short zones. He’s admitted he will zone blitz a lot of the time, bringing at least five men at the QB. When the Cowboys do, they’ll have only three short zone defenders, as opposed to five in the cover two Dallas played so much in ‘06. This will place a greater premium on recognition and speed.
Take a look at the last two diagrams in Davie’s piece for an idea of how this will work. In each case the defense rushes five and sets in a 3-3 look behind it. For a look at Phillips’ zone blitz in the flesh, refer to this video of the ‘06 Chargers against Pittsburgh.
Pay particular attention to the first blitz on the reel, labeled “OLB stunt.” Use the pause button in the lower left to stop the action as the play unfolds.
This is a classic weakside overload. The Chargers line up in a base 3-4 look prior to the snap, with NT Jamal Williams shading to the strong side. The first key to the play is San Diego’s late blitz deployment. ILB Donnie Edwards waits until just before the snap before hustling to the line and blitzing in the A gap between the center and left guard. His late deployment gave the Steelers’ linemen little time to recognize the blitz and adjust their blocking accordingly.
Contrast this to Dallas’ blitzes last year, which tipped off their intentions well before the snap and allowed opposing QBs to audible to nullifying plays. Think of Jeff Garcia’s many such adjustments in the second Eagles’ game.
Back to the Chargers’ blitz. At the snap they have four rushers deployed against three Pittsburgh blockers on Ben Roethlisberger’s blind side. Williams rushes between the C and RG, tying them up. Edwards draws the LG and DRE Igor Olshansky loops wide to his right, taking the Steelers’ LT with him.
As a result, there is nobody to block OLB Shawne Merriman, who loops inside Olshansky and has an open lane to the QB. He bears down on Roethlisberger and forces a hurried, off-balance throw that is picked off.
Move the video forwards a second or so and look at the Chargers’ coverage. You have a 3-3 deployment in the secondary. This looks like a 5-1 at first, because the CBs are crowding the line, but each has responsibility for receivers cutting deep through their areas while the FS takes the lone receiver running a deep route through the middle.
The shorter coverage raises several points about Dallas’ ‘07 schemes. First, note that on this play the SS has responsibility for the short zone on the defense’s right. This would be Roy Williams’ in a Cowboys’ package. When Stewart said Roy Williams would no longer be in deep cover two as he was last year, this is what he’s referring to. Williams will either blitz or work on short zones, waiting for flaring RBs or receivers running short crossing routes in front of him. This plays much better to his skills than trying to turn and run with TEs and receivers in space.
Next, note that if both OLBs are blitzing or if Williams is blitzing that the flats will be the ILBs responsibility. Who do you trust more to man these expanded short zones, James and Ayodele or guys like Burnett, who played in the nickel, and Carpenter, who demonstrated cover skills in the Seattle game, where he defensed three passes?
That’s why nobody should look upon the ILB moves as demotions. Burnett’s and Carpenter’s cover skills will probably have as much to do with Phillips’ blitzing success as Ware’s, Ellis’ and Spencers’ rush skills.
posted by The Gryphon at 6:43 PM
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